In the article maturity mismatch in the Polish banking system is estimated based on the publicly available data. Then the impact on the economy is discussed.
Introduction
Maturity mismatch, the gap between maturities of assets and liabilities is one of the intrinsic features of the modern banking system. Some claim that the maturity mismatch has a benefit of satisfying investors' interim liquidity needs, therefore it needs to be supported by the authorities, e.g. through deposit insurance (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) . Others show that this mismatch (especially demandable debt) helps discipline bank managers (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991) . It is often claimed, however, that such gap is one of the crucial fragilities of the financial system and excessive maturity mismatch was one of the reasons of the financial crises (Viñals et al., 2010) . Additionally, Brunnermeier & Oehmke (2013) show that banks and their debt-holders are subject to incentives to shorten liability maturities and thus increase maturity mismatch beyond reasonable levels. Kotlikoff (2010) argues, that governmentsupported maturity mismatch is not only a serious threat to the economy, but it is simply unsustainable.
This article contains estimation of growing maturity gap in the Polish banking system and shows various risks arising from this increase. In the first section, estimation of maturity mismatch in Polish banks is presented. It seems that the gap between terms of assets and liabilities has been growing since the beginning of the millennium. Second section contains the discussion of various risks related to growing maturity mismatch both from microeconomic perspective (individual bank's point of view) and from macroeconomic perspective (systemic risk, monetary policy, financial cycles). In the third section, some subject-matter information related to the Polish banking system is presented.
1
Maturity mismatch in Polish banks -estimation Analysis of data on original maturities of loan portfolio shows however that periods for which loans were granted were growing throughout years 1996-2012. years 1996-2012) Source: Statistical data from National Bank of Poland's website (www.nbp.pl). 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Loans to households with original term > 5 years Loans to households with original term > 20 years
The data on original asset maturities from National Bank of Poland's website can also be used to estimate the average original maturity of assets. Figure 3 shows the result of such estimation. The calculation was performed using following formula:
where ABt stands for assets in bucket B in time t (ends of quarters were used) and mB stands for assumed average maturity in bucket B 1 .
Long-term residential mortgage loans constituted growing portion of banking assets in the described period -as a result average original maturity increased from around 5 to around 11 years. Figure 4 shows the result of a simple extrapolation using linear regression (single input variable being average original term, R 2 =98%).
1 0.5 year in the bucket with maturities up to 1 year, 3 years for bucket 1-5 years, 7.5 years for bucket 5-10 years, 15 years for bucket 10-20 years and 25 years for bucket with loans exceeding 20 years; additionally 12 years were assumed for loans to households and companies exceeding 5 year.s if further split was not avaiable (data before 2002 did not contain further split) and 7.5 years for other assets exceeding 5 years. Such approach to extrapolation may be naive -however, based on the presented data it is obvious that maturity of assets has been growing in most of the period 1996-2012. It would be safe to claim that residual maturity of banking assets increased from 2 or less years to more than 6 years. As maturity of liabilities most likely remained stable (did not increase), significant increase in maturity of assets translated into growing maturity mismatch.
The maturity gap in the Polish banking system is even bigger due to the fact that (a) most of the liabilities in the Polish banking system are deposits (~60% in relation to total assets) and (b) due to regulations and their interpretations all deposits in Poland are callable (maximal "penalty" being loss of accrued interest). As a result, even if a contractual maturity (original and residual) is, say, 1 year, actual "stressed" maturity is 0 days or 1 day -term deposits are practically identical to demand deposits. There are also other risks influenced by increasing maturity mismatch, e.g. model risk.
Model error may translate in greater losses if it affects assets with longer terms. Another case is legal risk. It is not hard to imagine that regulations or interpretations may change during the life of a long-term contract. For example, legal constructions in a standard loan contract designed to enable recovery process may become obsolete, and as a result the bank may suffer losses due to reduced recoveries from defaulted loans.
Microeconomic risks to individual banks, described above, may lead -through direct or indirect contagion, or through correlated sensitivity to structural shocks -to systemic disturbances and crises. Typical example is a bank run which may propagate through indirect channels to the entire system (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) . Another example of systemic crisis -driven by structural shock -is US S&L crisis in the eighties, mentioned before.
It is often claimed that "excessive" maturity mismatch was the source of the recent financial crisis. For example, a report of International Monetary Fund states: "Liquidity risk was also higher than recognized. Financial firms and key markets relied increasingly on short-term, wholesale funding and took on excessive maturity mismatches while failing to build adequate liquid asset buffers" (Viñals et al., 2010) . It is also stated that contrary to runs known from previous crises, in this case liquidity problems were driven mainly not by demand deposits, but by repo transactions (Hellwig, 2009) . Others add that maturity mismatch got out of control because of the shadow banking system, where this gap was widening without supervisory control and "safety net" (Ricks, 2010) .
Increased possibility of systemic crises is one of the major macroeconomic consequences of the described phenomenon. There are also other possible developments driven by the growing maturity mismatch which could be mentioned in this paper.
In the opinion of the author, increased maturity mismatch enables amplified money creation. Much more credit is generated in the economy when 20-or 30-year mortgage loans become possible, compared to the situation when standard loan term does not exceed, say, 10 years (the crucial factor here is credit affordability: 30-year loan enables higher mortgage approval rates and higher loan amounts). That's why maturity mismatches should be also looked at from the monetary policy point of view.
Growing maturity mismatch in case of Poland was driven mainly by longer maturities of loans to households -mostly residential mortgages. In other banking systems longer term illiquid projects may include corporate loans, for example construction loans. From monetary perspective increased possibility of credit creation may result in increase in prices. Longer term loans usually finance specific types of assets, therefore the obvious risk is that of incommensurate increase in asset prices, for example inflation of or bubble in house prices.
Implications of maturity mismatch to monetary policy are rarely discussed, which is surprising bearing in mind that maturity mismatch may be equally powerful driver of credit creation and monetary aggregates than some of standard monetary policy tools -obligatory reserve rates or interest rates. The problem becomes even more vital if banking supervisory body is not integrated with a central bank -in such a case risk of lack of coordination in this aspect is evident.
We can go even further discussing macroeconomic risks of growing maturity gap.
Some economists claim that maturity mismatches in the banking system result in distortions in market interest rates and constitute one of the major causes of business cycles. According Micro-and macro-economic discussions on ramifications of growing maturity gap should continue, as it could be expected that the Polish banking system is not the only system where such increase took place. Figure 5 . summarizes micro-and macro-economic consequences of the growing maturity gap mentioned in this paper. Theoretical discussion on the consequences of a growing maturity mismatch presented in the previous section can be supplemented with some insights into specific situation of the Polish banking system. Polish banks increased their risk when they widened the term gap between their assets and liabilities. In some cases this increase in risk manifested itself during the crisis.
For example deposit rollover risk resulted in increased liquidity tensions when the financial crisis started to influence Polish financial market. The transmission of the liquidity tensions went through at least three channels. First, financing gap in the Polish banking system (surplus of loans to customers over deposits from customers) was closed by foreign lending, mostly from mother companies of the banks. When liquidity tensions occurred, it was probably much more challenging to obtain the new funding or renew existing one on similar terms -customer deposits became an attractive alternative. Second channel is constituted by indirect contagion. When information on the liquidity problems of European and US banks started to emerge, Polish customers (both households and corporates) started to worry about security of their funds on bank accounts. According to National Bank of Poland's information on payment systems, at the height of the tensions, in October 2008, daily increases in cash in circulation reached the level of even 1-2 billion Polish zloty (approx. 0.2-0.5 bln euro), many times more than the levels known from past. Third channel, being a consequence of financing strategy for foreign currency loans is discussed below.
As a result of those three channels, customer deposit rates went up significantly (so called "deposit war"). Apart from liquidity risk, specific kind of interest rate risk (analogical to that of US S&Ls) manifested itself. As assets income of Polish banks is based, to great extent, on interbank market rates (used as a reference in contracts) and deposit interest income depends on rates on the customer deposit market, problems emerge if those two types of interest rates start to diverge. Before the crisis those two types of interest rates were highly correlated (Pearson's r exceeding 0.9), after 2008 the correlation seems to be low (~0.2)
When discussing maturity mismatch specifically in the Polish banking system, additional dimension should be taken into account: currency mismatch related to foreigncurrency lending. Currency mismatch of that kind brings additional risks: long-term assets denominated in foreign currencies (euro and Swiss franc being the most popular) are financed through the mixture of at least three components: Polish zloty deposits aided by off-balance sheet derivative instruments, bonds issued in foreign currencies and financing from mother companies.
In all above cases maturity mismatch occurs, but in the case of financing with Polish złoty deposits the mismatch seems to be most fateful. When foreign currency loans are financed through short-term Polish złoty deposits a bank reduces its currency risk using swaps (either shorter-term FX-swaps, or longer term cross currency interest rate swaps). Those swaps are also short-or medium-term: FX-swaps have usually maturity of several months, CCIRS transactions are longer -up to several years. As a result there is a triple mismatch:
long term loans, short-term deposits and short/medium-term swaps. Rollover risk is affecting not only deposits, but also swaps. Sudden change in the foreign exchange rate may cause additional cash needs to cover swap settlement. It seems that swap rollover needs were an additional important driver of a sudden increase in customer deposit rates ("deposit war") in 
Conclusion
Increased attention to the risks associated with maturity mismatch is definitely needed, both from academia and policy makers. Growth in the gap presented in the first section is quite significant -the term structure of Polish banking system is entirely different to what it looked like just 10 years ago. A number of risks related to the increase of the maturity mismatch, both micro-and macroeconomic have been mentioned in the article. It is quite probable there are also several other aspects of this situation, not enumerated here. It would also be interesting to see if similar change took place in other banking systems.
If excessive maturity mismatch is dangerous to the economy, adequate regulatory policy should be considered. It is not clear how to address the problem of limiting maturity mismatch unless radical reform proposals are accepted. Such reforms would include banning "fractional reserves" -Huerta de Soto's (2009) proposal is one of them, another is "limited purpose banking" by Kotlikoff (2010) . If maturity mismatch needs to be limited, not eliminated altogether, there is no certainty as to appropriate policy actions. One thing is that it is not clear when maturity mismatch starts to be "excessive", another is that system limiting maturity mismatch in particular institutions would easily be avoided by maturity cascades as 2 SB_A_NOMHOUSE variable within "Alert Mechanism Framework" ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/economic_reforms/api/data.cfm?application_name=mip&timeSeri es=&group=SBA&country=&year=&format=excel&FC=1&L=1&LY=1&x=0&v=L described by Hellwig (1995) . It is also interesting to note that Basel's NSFR measure which is aimed at reduction of structural liquidity imbalances has a perspective of 1 year, and does not differentiate longer terms -residual maturity of 2 years is not differentiated from 20-year maturity in this framework. It is not clear whether this is a correct approach. Those and other questions related to maturity mismatch still need to be answered.
